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Mit diesem Aufsatz soll demonstriert werden, dass das 
Phänomen Modalität neben seiner objektsprachlichen 
Existenz auch als deskriptives Mittel der Sprachtheorie 
verwendet werden kann. In Nielsen (2003) habe ich eine 
Sprachtheorie vorgelegt, nach der die semantischen 
Aspekte der natürlichen Sprache einen grundsätzlich 
unentscheidbaren Bereich bilden. Wie jede 
sprachskeptische Theorie muss auch die meinige mit 
dem bekannten Dilemma der Selbstreferenz 
zurechtkommen. Hier bietet sich die formale Technik der 
Kripke-Modalität als eine praktikable Lösung dar. Ich 
zeige, wie diejenigen sprachlichen Züge, die meiner 
Theorie zufolge für das Entstehen semantischer 
Unentscheidbarkeit verantwortlich sind, als vier formale 
Restriktionen eines modalen Kripke-Modells abzubilden 
sind (Irreflexibilität, Endlichkeit, inverse 
Wohlfundiertheit, strikte Linearität). Ich zeige weiter, wie 
sich diesem Modell eine formale Modalsprache 
zuordnen lässt, die das Modell und seine interne Struktur 
absolut entscheidbar denotiert. Da das Modell die 
relevanten Grundzüge meiner Theorie repräsentiert, 
mag die zugeordnete formale Sprache nun als ein 
Darstellungsmittel betrachtet werden, das die 
semantische Unentscheidbarkeit, von der es spricht, 
denotiert, ohne dabei dieser gleichzeitig zu verfallen. 
 
1. THE LANGUAGE SCEPTIC’S PARADOX – A PROBLEM EXPLAINED 
Many paradoxes arise from the linguistic combination of self-reference and 
negation. The Cretan claiming all Cretans to be liars provides one famous 
example. If the Cretan speaks the truth, he ought to be lying since that is the 
way of all Cretans; but then again, if he really lies as all Cretans are known to 
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do, then he just may speak the truth, in which case he ought to be lying etc. 
Paradoxical experiences with language often lead to scepticism about the 
cognitive values of language. A century after the Cretan Epimenides disowned 
his fellow islanders, the sophist Gorgias launched a general attack on knowledge. 
Nothing exists, and should it exist, we could not know it, and should we be able 
to know it, we would be unable to say what we knew. Man is not adequately 
equipped to have knowledge. Language is no adequate instrument for expressing 
knowledge. 
With Gorgias, epistemic and linguistic scepticism fused. There have been many 
attempts to silence the sophist suspicion, but none that has proved definite, or 
even broadly convincing. However, there is a problem with theoretically 
expressing and defending the position of epistemic language scepticism. 
Whoever tries, runs into a paradox, not unlike that of Cretan liars. Perhaps, the 
theoretical aspect of what happens when the attempt is made, is best explained 
in terms of consistency. Suppose that a language sceptic wants to argue the 
claim that all texts of natural language are inherently inconsistent. We need two 
things for the paradox to materialise: negation and self-reference. In our case, 
negation is inherent in the very property of inconsistency, and self-reference is 
achieved by applying the claim of inconsistency to the very text of natural 
language arguing the inconsistency of all natural language texts. Now, if the 
sceptic’s arguments are consistent, he produces a text of natural language that is 
not consistent with his position as a sceptic, and so his arguments have 
disproved his language scepticism. On the other hand, should the sceptic’s text 
prove to be inherently inconsistent, the sceptic will have produced a text that, 
albeit consistent with his scepticism, through its internal inconsistency will fail 
to prove its point. Under inconsistency nothing can be proved. 
Cretans become liars by telling the truth and truth-tellers by lying. Language 
sceptics become inconsistent by consistently arguing their position, and 
consistent by inconsistent arguments. Cretans and language sceptics have an 
equal share in paradoxical speech. Or so it seems; for on closer consideration, 
one may detect a difference between the two kinds of paradoxes. Cretans can 
neither tell the truth, nor lie about their lying. If they could, there would be no 
paradox. It is a different story with language sceptics. 
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Like Cretans, language sceptics know of two situations: they may consistently or 
inconsistently argue the inconsistency of all language texts. But it is only the 
former situation that is truly paradoxical. Just as Cretans fail to succeed in 
speaking truthfully about their lying, no language sceptics consistently manage 
to argue the inconsistency of all language texts. For if they could, they would 
have done what they had proved to be impossible (argued consistently). Hence 
the smack of paradox. But the second situation is perfectly in order: Naturally, 
language sceptics may inconsistently argue the inconsistency of natural 
language – that is, if you are ready to accept the notion of inconsistent argument. 
If Cretans lie about their lying, they tell the truth, and so the paradox starts 
rolling. But language sceptics arguing the inconsistency of all natural language 
argument, do not thereby get their linguistic behaviour entangled in paradoxical 
speech. As most language users know, inconsistent argument is an all too natural 
species of human communication. According to sceptics, the only one that man 
has access to at all. 
When Cretans speak, they create a paradoxical situation between two symmetric 
positions, truth and falsity. With language sceptics, two asymmetric kinds of 
consistency are involved, one pertaining to the relationship between the sceptic 
and the text, another pertaining solely to the text. Let us call the former kind of 
consistency performative1, and the latter textual. Formally, the language sceptic 
should know of two situations, one combining performative inconsistency with 
textual consistency, and one combining performative consistency with textual 
inconsistency. In real life, however, only the second combination is possible. 
Through the very notion of textual consistency, language sceptics are not likely to 
find themselves in a situation where they have become performatively 
inconsistent by consistently arguing their case. No one can consistently argue 
the inconsistency of all natural language texts. So languages sceptics, we may 
say, are better off than Cretans. Since it is performatively consistent for language 
sceptics to be textually inconsistent, it is not the blemish of paradox that 
language sceptics need to fear. 
In 2003, I presented a theory of language scepticism2. In the theory, two strands 
of reasoning are combined. The first may be characterised as the attempt to read 
Spinoza’s Ethica as a forerunner of analytic language theory. The second is 
indicated by the subtitle of the book: Toward a Formal Theory of Consistent 
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Language Scepticism. According to my interpretation, Ethica is organised around a 
paradox of language scepticism quite similar to that explained above. I argue 
that Spinoza discovered that his theory of affects applied to natural language. 
The use of natural language is basically an affective affair, and since affects, 
under Spinoza’s interpretation, distort cognition, no text of natural language can 
produce cognition. Assuming that Spinoza did nourish cognitive aspirations on 
the part of his Ethica3, I further argue that Spinoza’s reasons for choosing a 
geometrical format for his text originated in the belief that he could thereby 
immunise his own text from the cognitive defects otherwise befalling all kinds 
of natural language. The idea was bold, but at Spinoza’s time, the formal 
resources of logic were not sufficiently developed to make the plan work.  
Spinoza tried to escape the paradox of language scepticism, not by accepting 
inconsistency for his reasoning, but by disciplining his arguing through logic. As 
documented4 many times, Spinoza did not accomplish his aim. In my opinion, 
Spinoza was hampered not only by the insufficient state of logic at his time; the 
whole idea of making natural language consistent by artificial means is 
misdirected. No use of natural language, however disciplined by geometry or 
logic, can, in my opinion, consistently demonstrate the inconsistency (with 
Spinoza: the affectability) of all texts of natural language. Consistency, as I 
suppose, is not to be had in natural language. A theory effectively aspiring to be 
consistently arguing the inconsistency of all texts of natural language is 
therefore well advised to forgo the use of natural language when ultimately 
setting out its points. 
For the rest of this paper, I shall have nothing more to say about Spinoza’s 
heroic fight with language. Instead I shall focus on explaining what I did in 
order to escape the theoretical dilemma of language scepticism. Sceptics leave 
paradoxes behind when they speak inconsistently about the inconsistency of 
natural language. But obviously, inconsistent speech is not very convincing – 
that is, if we notice. When needed or convenient, we often accept 
understandability for consistency. So, the real challenge for the ambitious 
sceptic is to find a way of arguing or presenting a theory of language scepticism 
satisfying effective criteria of consistency. The second part of my book was 
dedicated to that task. 
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In my brand of language scepticism, natural language equals usage. Quite 
generally, I describe usage as a change-inducing mechanism, operating in time 
according to deterministic laws. Usage effects changes in those engaged in usage. 
These changes are both mental and cerebral. What happens on the mental side, I 
call meanings. Meanings change by being activated (used). These changes are 
undecidable in the sense that no mechanism can be devised that would enable 
us to identify the meanings changing. It is another story with the brain, but that 
is beyond the point here. My theory is solely about meanings. 
Users are either producers or recipients. There is no way to effectively decide 
what kinds of change that producers think their usage might effect in others (or 
in themselves), just as it is beyond our knowledge to determine what recipients 
believe the usage they receive (and process) to have effected in themselves. The 
intentions of users may be guessed at, but never, effectively, known. There is 
only one way of making usage decidable, and that is by tying all parts of usage, 
word by word, structure by structure, effectively to observable objects. The 
scientific usage of natural language may under certain well-controlled 
circumstances come within tolerable reach of this ideal. But normally, natural 
language usage functions according to quite different parameters. 
I divide my theory in two parts: in the first half, I lay out, in normal scholarly 
English, the arguments and the evidence that sustain my theory. I write in the 
professional language of analytic theory, but my intentions are different from 
those, I gather, normally nourishing academic speech. I write with a view, not to 
proving any points (that would be openly inconsistent with my scepticism), but 
to changing readers’ attitude to language (usage) in the sceptical direction I 
promote. Naturally, readers are, and will be, free to read my text with very 
different intentions. There is little in my interpretative or argumentative style to 
surprise or alienate professional readers. They may, for instance, choose to 
disregard my repeated indications of sceptical intentions, should they so want. 
Readers may even credit me with having proved the sceptic’s case beyond any 
reasonable doubt. Being a sceptic, I would obviously have to disagree on the 
latter point. 
For the second half of my book, I hope for readers made, by the first half, 
sufficiently susceptible to language scepticism in order to accept the need for 
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decidably consistent theory. Yet less will also do. The second half is meant to 
interest not only persuaded sceptics, but also linguists or language theorists 
merely curious about the issue of consistency. 
After having motivated readers to embrace or consider the position of language 
scepticism, I start out by devising a theory capable of expressing, in a totally 
consistent and decidable manner, my crucial points about the undecidabilities of 
meaning change. Like many scientists grown weary with the unruliness of 
natural language (if for slightly other reasons (see below)), I turn to formal 
languages. More precisely, I direct my search for expressive clarity to the branch 
of formal logic known as modal logic. Here I focus on the kind of model theory 
named after the logician Kripke. My idea is to find a modal Kripke model that I 
can regard as a formal representation of my views of natural language meaning 
change. How this is done and the consequences will be the subject of the 
remaining part of this paper. Perhaps, I should emphasise that my presentation 
of modal model theory is solely meant for linguists and language theorists. 
Logicians interested in seeing how their techniques may be applied outside the 
field for which they were designed, may find the presentation illuminating, but 
they will meet with little that will appeal to their professional creed or skills. 
2. DECIDABILITY – A CONCEPT EXPLAINED 
Historically, and technically, decidability is a formal concept. It emerged out of 
Gödel’s spectacular findings in 19315. Much to the surprise of mathematicians 
and logicians, Gödel discovered that not all formal systems are decidable. I shall 
not bother with the details here. I have discussed them in length in Nielsen 
(2003). However, once we know that some specific formal system, a formal 
language, is decidable, then we know that we can fully control our use of that 
language. In a moment, I shall extend the notion of decidability to non-formal 
areas as well, but the basic idea, both in formal and non-formal decidability, is 
that of possessing a purely mechanical procedure for determining, in an 
absolutely rigorous way, on some precisely formulated issue (often one that can 
be answered with a yes or a no). 
Let us distinguish between two faces of formal decidability: a grammatical one 
and a referential (semantic) one. Logicians normally speak of decidability only in 
connection with grammar. What I have chosen to call referential (semantic) 
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decidability is certainly a formal concept (in fact two), albeit rarely referred to 
under that heading6. My deviation from standard practice is more than 
terminological; it has to do with a restriction that I impose on my use (and 
understanding) of formal systems. In Nielsen (2003), I worked only with formal 
systems that can be realised in some physical medium, be it graphematic, 
electronic or whatever. Logicians would oppose such narrowness. Most of the 
things they want to do in and with formal systems can only be done when 
formal systems are unfettered by physical restrictions. Of course, I do not want 
to dispute the legitimacy or the necessity of the logicians’ choice. There would 
be little left of their profession were they debarred from working with abstract 
systems. However, my interest in formal logic is very different from that of the 
professional logician. To me, a language theorist, formal logic is more – or 
perhaps I should say less – than a mathematically sophisticated branch of 
philosophy. I consider formal logic a reservoir of techniques to be freely used in 
the service of other disciplines. Not all of formal logic is decidable. However, 
when reduced to physical (and finite) dimensions, formal techniques shrink into 
decidable (and logically trivial) standards. 
In the world of physical systems, decidability is no longer a purely formal 
concept, but takes on a more universal feature. In Nielsen (2003), I have argued 
that a Turing machine, reduced to finite dimensions, encapsulates the essence of 
what, in a physical system, one would like to understand by decidability. A 
procedure, a rule, a set is decidable if there is a purely mechanical way of 
determining the outcome of the procedure, the effect of the rule, or the 
extension of the set. 
With these qualifications, one may give the following explanation of 
grammatical and referential decidability as applied to physically restricted 
formal systems7. A formal system consists of a (finite) vocabulary, meaning and 
denoting nothing, together with a grammar. A vocabulary may typically contain 
single words or letters (of various categories), operators (of various categories) 
and auxiliary signs. By means of the grammar, two sets of constructions may be 
defined: (1) the set of well-formed expressions, (2) the set of proofs. A proof is a 
special sequence of well-formed expressions. The last well-formed expression of 
the proof is called a thesis. One should be careful not to associate any special 
prestige to the grammatical category of theses. From the view-point of grammar, 
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theses are just expressions complying with certain rules of construction. A 
formal system, then, is said to be grammatically decidable if any combination of 
elements from its vocabulary can be uniquely (and mechanically) parsed8. All 
the formal systems discussed in this paper will be grammatically decidable. 
When logicians speak of proofs they are either referring to grammatical proofs of 
the kind just indicated9 or to special insights or procedures transcending the 
capacities of grammars. Most logicians agree on which procedures to accept and 
which to disown10. The matter is too complicated to be dealt with here. In this 
context, where logic has been reduced to a physical format, let us content 
ourselves with demanding that all procedures involved in non-grammatical 
proofs be as decidable as their grammatical cousins11. 
What I have chosen to call referential (semantic) decidability is mostly dealt with 
by logicians under the headings of soundness and (semantic) completeness12 
respectively. It is rather limited what can be done with a formal system alone 
apart from studying its grammatical features. If you want to extend the use of 
formal systems for instance by using it as a language with which to speak of 
other things (eventually itself), you must supplement the formal system with the 
kind of formal structure that logicians call a model. Logicians, of course, think of 
models as abstract, mostly set-theoretical, constructions. Abiding by my 
materialism, I demand of models that they should always, in principle, be 
susceptible to physical realisation or computer simulation. But whatever the 
stuff that models are made of, basically a model is a collection of those items 
that one uses a formal system to refer to (speak of). 
Logicians study the relationship between formal systems and models under the 
two aspects alluded to above. Both involve the notion of formal truth. From our 
view-point, we may think of formal truth in terms of reference or denotation13. If 
an expression of a formal system is formally true in a model, then that 
expression will have what I shall call a positive reference in that model. To 
establish a positive reference, one, normally, proceeds by first determining the 
reference of the single words in one’s vocabulary, and then going on to decide 
what the referential effects of the grammatical rules are. An expression has 
positive reference, then, if the grammatical rules allow for the words of the 
expression to refer to items in the model. 
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Let us take a simple example. Suppose we had, in the vocabulary of some formal 
system, the word α, and α referred to item A in some model. And suppose we 
had, in the same vocabulary, the operator ¬, along with a grammatical rule for 
using ¬ to the effect that ¬α was a well-formed expression. And finally, suppose 
that the referential effect of this grammatical rule should be to reverse the 
referential effect of the expression immediately after the operator. In this case ¬ 
would reverse the positive reference (the formal truth) of α into a negative one 
in the model. Notice that positive and negative references (formal truth and 
falsity) only make sense when viewed in relation to some specific model (or 
some class of models). 
As might be clear from my explanation, all formal words will normally have a 
positive reference in some suitable model. This is seldom an agreeable situation 
to work with. So, in order to avoid this effect, logicians often prefer to work with 
systems that have no such words. Logicians call words with a fixed positive 
reference constants. The opposite of constants they call variables. One may think 
of variables as formal words that have not yet received some fixed positive 
reference. They are sort of temporary place-holders for future reference. 
One can achieve the same effect by generalising over reference. Suppose we had 
a formal system with only two formal words, α and β, and likewise a model with 
only two items A and B. We might then wish to establish the maximal number 
of different ways in which the words of the system could be referentially 
combined with that model. When logicians (and mathematicians) generalise, 
they often include the empty possibility in the totality of items that they 
generalise over. Since, in this case, there is a perfectly good reason for adopting 
the logician’s view-point, let me introduce the notion of an empty reference. Let 
us say that a formal word (of some system) has an empty reference if there is no 
item in the model to which the system refers. Let us call empty reference 
cenonymy14. By empty reference I am referring to a special case of negative 
reference. For convenience, I shall adopt the mathematician’s practice and 
denote the empty element by Ø. 
If we now, armed with cenonymy, ask how many different ways in which we 
may establish reference for α and β in some model containing only A and B 
(plus the spooky Ø), we get two different answers according with our generosity 
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with synonymy15. The two situations may be illustrated simply by listing the 
possible pairs: 
1. Without synonymy: six possibilities: [(α,A), (β,B)], [(α,A), (β,Ø)], [(α,B), 
(β,A)], [(α,B), (β,Ø)], [(α,Ø), (β,A)], [(α,Ø), (β,B)] 
2. With synonymy: nine possibilities: [(α,A), (β,B)], [(α,A), (β,Ø)], [(α,A), 
(β,A)], [(α,B), (β,A)], [(α,B), (β,Ø)], [(α,B), (β,B)], [(α,Ø), (β,A)], [(α,Ø), (β,B)], 
[(α,Ø), (β,Ø)] 
 
Either list represents a special way of generalising over reference. The common 
idea is that of running through all admissible combinations between words and 
referents. In the former case, we found six different ways of attaching reference 
to our formal system, in the second nine. When we think of the relationship 
between a formal system and a model in this generalised way we say that an 
expression has valid reference (is valid) if it has a positive reference (if it is 
formally true) in any of the possibilities for combining words with referents in a 
model. When the relationship between a formal system and a model is 
conceived in this generalised fashion, the model is often called a frame16. 
With the concept of a frame we are finally ready to understand the basic idea 
behind referential decidability. As previously stated, logicians address this issue 
under two headings: soundness and completeness. A system is said to be sound 
with respect to a frame if all theses of the system have valid reference on that 
frame17. With completeness, the condition is the other way around: a system is 
said to be complete with respect to a frame if all expressions with valid reference 
on that frame are theses of the system. Having generalised over reference, we 
may be sure that no single words will have valid reference on a frame. The 
concept of cenonymy took care of that, as you may care to check in the two 
versions of generalised reference listed above. 
So, what the idea behind referential decidability amounts to is that it enables the 
user of a formal system to establish an identity relation between the theses of 
the system and the expressions having valid reference on some frame. If a formal 
system is referentially decidable with respect to some frame, then we may be 
sure that all its theses, and all its theses only, will refer to items on that frame. 
Logical languages are regularly studied for the features of decidability. Once a 
new kind of logical language has been designed (or discovered) logicians check 
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whether this new language complies with the strict demands of decidability. 
Most do, some do not. On my restricted view of logic, one can always tell 
whether or not some formal system is referentially decidable with respect to 
some frame. In real logical life, things are often much more complicated. 
3. DENOTING MEANING – A METHOD EXPLAINED 
I advocate a theory of meaning holding natural language meanings to be 
inherently undecidable. We can neither identify nor define natural language 
meanings. They change by being used, and since they exist only during and in 
usage, there can be no place from which meanings could be observed and 
identified which would not itself effect meaning change18. Were I now to hold 
that the meaning changes to which my theory (the reading of it) might give rise 
would have the identity and definitional force needed to support a theory, I 
would, as previously stated, be performatively inconsistent. I would demand 
something from my own usage that I deny to all other usage. 
But meanings, one may counter, are hardly the stuff that proper theories should 
be made of. A theory, worth its salt, is basically a text, an ordered sequence of 
sentences with controllable references, and should be measured by its 
contribution to our grasp of the items referred to by the theory. However, the 
shift of focus from meanings to texts and referents does not make my theory fare 
any better as far as its main issue is concerned. Clearly, there are many aspects 
about usage that may be denoted in a sufficiently controllable way in order for 
professionals to assess the correctness of some theory on these points, but it 
should be equally clear that the meaning aspect will not be one of those. When 
there is nothing to identify, there is nothing to denote or to control. 
Above, I discussed the general case of language scepticism. In the special case of 
meaning scepticism, such as presented here, the notion of textual inconsistency 
may now be given a more precise turn. The sceptic writing a theory about a 
subject that according to that theory defies identification confronts the 
challenge of writing about something which by hypothesis eludes reference. 
Reapplying a term previously introduced, we may say that meaning sceptics, in 
addition to the general plight of paradox, face the dilemma of theoretical 
cenonymy. They have to write about something that cannot be referred to at 
all19. 
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In Nielsen (2003), I made the distinction between meanings (the plural) and 
meaning sui generis (the singular). By the plural I wanted to refer to the 
individual members in the class of those phenomena that one cannot, according 
to my theory, refer to individually. When using the genetic singular, I had a 
different referent in mind. I was thinking less of specific meanings occurring 
than of something which could also have been called the general structure of 
meaning. I argue that meanings are systematically undecidable, but I likewise 
contend that their undecidability happens under circumstances or in a mould 
that can be precisely and decidably described. What meanings are, is 
undecidable, but what makes them so need not therefore defy description. 
Shifting the focus of my theory from meanings (the plural) to meaning (the 
singular) helped me reduce the problem of cenonymy to that of finding 
decidable means of denoting meaning. I strongly doubt that texts of natural 
languages can be so disciplined as to be grammatically and referentially 
decidable20. In my opinion, no one really knows. Of course, my suspicion would 
be immediately disproved the moment someone produced just one single 
instance of a grammatically and referentially decidable text of natural language. 
But as long as no such specimen has ever come to my attention, I abide by my 
scepticism. If undecidability could come in degrees then I would assume for 
natural languages an ascending scale with grammar at the bottom and meaning 
at the top, and with reference somewhere in between. 
Like me, also natural scientists distrust natural language. They have long ago 
given up pinning their professional faith on the referential decidability (or only 
reliance) of the natural languages. Instead they turn to mathematics or other 
formal languages when precision is in demand. As should be clear by now, I 
fully subscribe not only to the tacit disparagement of natural language inherent 
in the practices of natural science, but also to their choice of alternatives. So 
instead of trying to make natural language fit a controllable mould (Spinoza’s 
way), I have chosen to use only completely formal and artificial techniques in 
my quest for referential decidability. 
From my natural language presentation of the structure of meaning (the 
singular) I extracted the following four main characteristics of meanings (the 
plural). 
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1. Natural language meanings are unrepeatable – no two occurrences of 
natural language meaning can be identical. 
2. The number of meanings occurring, in some specific group of users, are 
finite. 
3. Natural language meanings are determined by causal factors – meanings 
occur beyond our conscious control (or what we experience as conscious 
control is among the effects of meanings occurring). 
4. Natural language meanings are temporal by nature – meanings occur in 
time. 
 
Having thus reduced the general features of meaning to a tolerably tractable 
standard, I made the decisive move to formal techniques. For various reasons, I 
had become interested in the formal structures known as Kripke frames. 
Remember my approach to formal techniques. I use them as if they were 
physical procedures. So, I simply set out to investigate whether there among the 
rich variety of different Kripke frames could be a physically constructible one 
that could instantiate all four characteristics of meanings just indicated. As it 
turned out, my search was successful. I ended up with quite an interesting 
specimen. In the next and final section, I shall report some of the details of my 
findings. 
4. DECIDABLY DENOTING – A TECHNIQUE EXPLAINED 
In formal systems, modality is introduced by adding to the vocabulary of a non-
modal system the two operators box and diamond,  and ◊. Actually, one of 
these will do, but for the sake of perspicuity I shall use both. Form the view-
point of formal systems neither box nor diamond means anything; they are just 
inscriptions obeying grammatical rules. One often refers to the two operators as 
necessity and possibility, respectively, but one should be careful not to attach any 
particular importance to these names as far as formal systems are concerned. It is 
another matter when formal systems are used for referential purposes. Then the 
question arises of how to interpret well-formed expressions containing either 
operator. 
In 1963, the logician and language theorist Kripke published a paper showing 
how to interpret so-called propositional modal systems in a strikingly simple 
and elegant way (Kripke 1963[1971]). The method has later been expanded to 
predicate modal systems as well, but, perhaps inevitably, not without losing 
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some of its simplicity in the process. Predicate modal logic is a notoriously 
complicated affair, making it all the more reasonable to be pleased with the fact 
that we shall only have to deal with propositional modal systems (and their 
formal referents). 
In section 1, I gave an informal explanation of how non-modal formal systems 
may be used for referential purposes. I showed how to define the notion of 
referential decidability (soundness and completeness) in terms of generalised models, 
also called frames. Basically, the same definition applies to modal formal systems 
as well. However, since in this section the emphasis will be on explaining the 
actual workings of formal reference, I shall set out the mechanism combining 
systems with models and frames once again, but now in a more detailed fashion. 
Logicians often speak of reference in terms of interpretation. An interpretation is 
simply a model; thus, a frame is a generalised interpretation. Since models for21 
modal systems are more complicated than those for non-modal systems, I start 
by explaining the simpler case. Non-modal systems are interpreted by defining a 
function from the expressions and the grammar of a formal system to items of 
the model. Formally, a model for a non-modal system is defined as the pair 
<D,V>. D denotes the domain of discourse that the expressions of the system 
refer to. V is the name of the function mapping expressions on to elements of D. 
The interpretation of non-modal operators is defined in terms of certain truth-
conditional manoeuvres. In section 1, I gave an example of how the negation 
operator may be interpreted. 
Modal systems call for a more elaborate interpretation (model). We start by 
dividing the domain of discourse into a multitude of different domains, each 
called a world. By using this terminology, Kripke obviously wanted to hark back 
to Leibniz’s famous metaphysics of possible worlds. The idea is that we think of 
a possible world as a full description of some alternative to what we believe the 
actual world to be. Naturally, Kripke’s definition of a possible world is 
completely formal. You need not believe in possible worlds in order to work 
with Kripke semantics. Some people, like me, prefer to think of a world solely as 
a collection of physical items. Whatever the case may be, in a Kripke model, the 
items to be spoken of by means of the formal system do not make up a uniform 
collection, but are grouped together in different sets or worlds. We therefore 
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need a structure combining these worlds. Kripke showed that this job could be 
done simply by means of the dyadic relation R. By imposing varying conditions 
on R different structures would arise. It sounds like such a simple construction, 
but as the literature has shown, the dyadic R often gives rise to an amazingly 
rich variety of very sophisticated structures. 
One of the conditions that may be placed on R is that of symmetry, but unless 
otherwise stated R is asymmetric. Another way of saying the same is to call R 
oriented or, as customary, to speak of R as an accessibility or successor relation. 
If two worlds, w and w’, are connected by R, in that order, then the relation runs 
from w to w’. One normally denotes this relation as wRw’ , and wRw’ is often 
circumscribed by saying that w has access to w’, or that w’ is the successor of w. 
Formally, a Kripke model is the triple <W,R,V> with W being a set of worlds, R a 
dyadic relation, and V, as before, a function mapping expressions of a formal 
system on to the elements in the worlds of W. 
A modal expression is always to be interpreted relative to some world w. The two 
modal operators are interpreted in terms of R. If α is some expression (or formal 
word) of some formal system, then α is interpreted by the stipulation that α is 
true (has a positive reference) relative to w if α is true (has a positive reference) 
relative to all worlds w’ accessible from w. And ◊α is interpreted by the 
stipulation that ◊α is true (has a positive reference) relative to w if α is true (has a 
positive reference) relative to at least one world w’ accessible from w. As may be 
seen, modal operators introduce an aspect of quantificational logic also when 
the formal system in question is purely propositional22. 
In principle, there is only one system of non-modal propositional logic. There 
are many ways of setting up its axioms (that is, its basic theses), but they all 
produce the same system. With modal systems, things are more complicated. As 
new modal axioms are added to a system, different modal systems appear23, and 
since there seems to be no upper limit to the number of new axioms that can be 
added, modal systems make up an ever expanding class of formal systems. 
It was for this multitude that Kripke designed his new way of interpreting. 
Kripke showed that one could obtain referential decidability for a great number 
of grammatically decidable modal systems simply by imposing special 
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conditions on the dyadic relation R of the models for particular systems. If a 
modal system is grammatically decidable, then there exists a totally mechanical 
way of identifying those expressions which are theses. By referential decidability 
one denotes a situation where the theses of some system are exactly the same as 
those expressions that have valid reference (are valid) on some frame. So by 
means of grammatical and referential decidability, theses and valid expressions 
will be uniquely identified. We know that a frame is just a generalisation over 
some class of models. With the notation introduced in this section, this idea can 
now be given a more formal turn: suppose we had some Kripke model M = 
<W,R,V>. We may now think of all the models differing from M only in the way 
in which V is defined between expressions and items of the worlds of W. All 
these models (together with the initial M) would make up exactly that class over 
which we generalise in order to get a frame. One indicates the result of this 
process simply by letting out the mapping V. Thus, a Kripke frame is the pair 
<W,R>, where W is a set of worlds, and R some dyadic relation. 
Let me give a few examples of how referential decidability between modal 
systems and a frame is achieved by imposing suitable restrictions on R24. If you 
add the axiom known as D25 (for deontic): α → ◊α, to the non-modal 
propositional system (remember: there is only one), you get a modal system 
(also known as D) which may be proved to be grammatically and referentially 
decidable with respect to a frame where R is defined as follows: for all w in W, 
there exists at least one w’ in W such that wRw’. This condition is often called 
seriality, and it has the effect of imposing on W a structure that is characterised 
by having no ends. There is no w that does not have access to at least one more 
w’. Seriality may be realised either by allowing W to be infinite or by imposing a 
circular structure on W. Naturally, materialists like me prefer the latter solution. 
Another simple example would be the axiom known as T26: A → A. When 
added to the propositional system, a modal system, also named T, emerges. The 
system T is referentially decidable with respect to a frame which has an R with 
the following very simple characteristic: for all w in W: wRw. The condition is 
called reflexivity since what it amounts to is the condition that every world 
should have access to itself. One can prove that whereas reflexivity entails 
seriality, entailment does not work the other way around: seriality does not 
entail reflexivity. This means that the system T is contained in D and that the R 
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in the frame for T in addition to being reflexive will also be serial. If you 
compare the definition of seriality with that of reflexivity, you will soon discover 
reflexivity to be but a special case of seriality: if every w has access to itself, then 
every w also fulfils the condition that there is at least one w’ in W such that 
wRw’, namely w itself (when w’ = w). 
These few examples should suffice to give the reader a first impression of the 
flexibility of a Kripke frame. In my search for a decidable theory of meaning 
scepticism, I could not help becoming impressed by the richness of structures 
that a Kripke frame allows you to define simply in terms of one dyadic relation. 
It is clear that my problems as a sceptic would be solved the moment I managed 
to define a Kripke frame that could represent the four main characteristics of 
meaning listed in the previous section. For, if such a frame could be devised, 
there would also be a modal system that would be referentially decidable with 
respect to that frame. And since that modal system would be grammatically 
decidable as well, we would have a formal system in which to speak with 
absolute precision and decidability about a structure that – according to my 
stipulations – represented the main tenets of my theory of meaning. So, could a 
suitable Kripke frame be found, I would thereby have produced a very effective 
solution to the problem of expressing a theory of language scepticism without 
incurring the familiar paradoxes or inconsistencies. 
As we know, a Kripke frame is just a pair <W,R>, where W is a set of so-called 
worlds and R a dyadic relation on W (that is between the worlds of W). We need 
not care that much about what worlds are. What we wish is to find a structure 
between these worlds that may represent the structure of meaning. However, for 
the record, let us think of a world as a collection of physical items. Each item 
may be thought of as representing some individual meaning. Since meanings, 
according to my theory, cannot be individually identified, we have to make sure 
that the structure we are looking for precludes any such identification. One of 
the first steps towards this goal is to ensure that no representative of meaning is 
contained in two or more worlds. So all worlds are different in the rather strong 
sense that each world contains a completely new stock of items. With these 
stipulations, we may think of W as representing some universe of meanings. 
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We now need to structure this universe. We want the universe to be organised in 
a fashion that makes meanings come out as unrepeatable, finite, causal and 
temporal units, and we want to represent these four features by means of 
restrictions on R. We start by letting R represent the relation that enables 
language users to process (have, produce, receive) meanings. We now ask which 
conditions must be placed on R for R to represent meaning processing as a 
unique, finite, causal and temporal affair. 
Meaning processing must be represented as unique in the sense that it should 
not be possible to process the same meaning twice (or more). No world contains 
any item that is also contained in some other world; so if R represents meaning 
processing it should be clear that R will always take its user to ever new 
meanings. However, there is one leak. We know what reflexivity means: it 
amounts to the condition on R that worlds have access to themselves. Now, if R 
were reflexive, then R would represent a meaning-processing structure where 
users could have (could process) the same meaning twice (or more). So if R were 
reflexive, worlds would be accessible from themselves and it would be possible 
for R to represent a kind of processing of meaning where one and the same 
meaning could be processed more than once. In that case, meanings would fail 
to come out as unique and unrepeatable events. However, if we arrange for R to 
be irreflexive, we are safe. Irreflexivity, together with the absolute uniqueness of 
worlds, gives us what we want: a precise representation of the unrepeatability of 
meanings. 
Now for the second feature: finiteness. W is supposed to represent some 
semantic universe of real language users; thus, clearly, finiteness would be a 
natural restriction to impose on R. No language user has access to an infinite 
number of meanings. Since W, according to my materialistic creed, is finite both 
with respect to the numbers of its worlds and to the numbers of items in each 
world, finiteness will, prior to any structuring of R, be a feature of any Kripke 
frame I use. We might agree to settle for this kind of built-in finiteness; however, 
since I want to make R bear as much of the representative burden as possible, I 
shall look for a restriction on R that has the same effect. 
There is a restriction known as converse well-foundedness27. It amounts to the 
condition that any subset of worlds from W must contain at least one last world, 
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i.e., a world without successor in that subset. Since all of W is likewise a subset of 
W, converse well-foundedness also requires that the whole of W contains some 
last world (or more, eventually). Above, when exemplifying the referential 
interrelationship between systems and frames, I mentioned the condition 
known as seriality. If R is serial, every world precisely has access to at least one 
more world. So, converse well-foundedness is in some sense the opposite of 
seriality28. 
It should be evident that the structure of converse well-foundedness is 
incompatible with R having to structure an infinity of worlds. In such a 
situation (which I, for one, cannot imagine), there would be no dead ends, since 
infinity would demand ever new successors. Apart from being incompatible with 
infinity, converse well-foundedness has another agreeable incompatibility. It 
also excludes reflexivity. For if R were reflexive, then all w’s would have access to 
themselves, and so there would be no worlds without successors. Under the 
condition of reflexivity, every world becomes its own successor. Under the 
condition of converse well-foundedness, some world has no successor. 
According to my Spinozist interpretation, causality and temporality turn out to 
be structurally similar aspects of meaning29. In meaning processing, cause and 
effect are linked together in the same fashion as before and after. No cause of 
meaning is simultaneous with its effects, nor posterior to the same. Effects of 
meaning follow their causes just as one moment of meaning may be said to 
follow the next. So in claiming meanings to occur in a causal and temporal 
manner, I merely want to emphasise that meanings, albeit mental units, does 
not behave any differently from how we may believe their neuro-physiological 
counterparts to behave. 
Logicians have been dealing with the combination of causality and temporality 
under the heading of determinism30. The issue is rather complicated and bristles 
with philosophical implications for which we have little use in this connection. 
What we are after is a condition on R that will impose a strict before-and-after 
(cause-and-effect) ordering on W. In the discipline known as temporal logic, the 
question of how to represent the flow of time has, naturally, come to the fore31. 
Especially two sets of conditions on R have attracted the interest of the craft: one 
known as weak linearity, the other sometimes referred to as discrete linearity. They 
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both have the effects of stringing out all members of W on one single line 
(hence the name linearity). The difference is that while the weak version may 
allow for simultaneity (i.e., clusters of worlds all accessible from one single 
preceding world), its discrete analogue excludes any such clustering of worlds. 
Among logicians, the first kind of ordering is normally assumed to represent the 
flow of time as a continuous affair, the latter as a discrete one (hence my 
nomination). From our point of view, however, there is a serious problem with 
both. They both imply reflexivity, that is, the possibility that some world may 
be its own successor. 
One may wonder why temporal logicians have come to believe that the flow of 
time includes the structure of reflexivity. The answer has to do with the way 
temporal logic emerged as a discipline32 and need not detain us here, especially 
since there exists a version of linearity, known as strict linearity, which is 
explicitly irreflexive. Like the two other forms of linearity, strict linearity 
organises its set of worlds along one line, but without clusters (simultaneity) 
and, as indicated, without reflexivity. More formally, by strict linearity one 
understands a dyadic relation R that in addition to being irreflexive is 
characterised by two conditions known as transitivity and weak connectedness. 
Strict linearity comes in a finite as well as an infinite version. We, of course, 
choose the finite one. Irreflexivity is already part of our conditioning of R. Both 
finiteness and irreflexitivity are included in the condition of converse well-
foundedness. But what about transitivity and weak connectedness? How do they 
agree with converse well-foundedness? 
Transitivity is the condition that if wRw’ and w’Rw’’, then we must also have 
wRw’’. If one world has access to another world with access to a third, then the 
first world must likewise have access to the third. Such are the workings of 
transitivity. I shall not go into the details of what transitivity does to the 
universe of meanings, the issue being thoroughly discussed in Nielsen (2003). 
Let me indicate instead how transitivity may be proved to be included in the 
condition of converse well-foundedness. 
Remember that we work protected by the orderliness of grammatical and 
referential decidability. This means that the grammar of modal systems and 
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conditions on R mirror each other in a completely uniform fashion (more 
specifically it means that for every condition on R there exists a modal system 
such that its theses are precisely those expressions that become valid on a frame 
where R has the condition in question). So when inquiring into whether two (or 
more) conditions on R may be compatible, one may seek an answer either by 
reasoning directly about R, or by studying the modal systems that mirror these 
conditions. 
Above, I showed reflexivity to be but a special case of seriality by directly 
reasoning about the features of R. I know of no similar arguing in the case before 
us, but fortunately a purely grammatical proof exists to the effect that converse 
well-foundedness implies transitivity. Since the proof is well suited for 
demonstrating how grammatical proofs work, I have included it in the 
appendix. 
So, transitivity merely forms a natural part of what converse well-foundedness 
demands. That leaves us with weak connectedness. Will this also be compatible 
with converse well-foundedness? By connectedness is meant the condition on R 
that no two worlds accessible from a third may fail to be related by R. More 
formally: if wRw’ and wRw’’, then either w’Rw’’ or w’’Rw’ (or both). The 
weakening of the condition consists in allowing w’ and w’’ to be one and the 
same world, in which case the condition merely states that no two worlds may 
fail to be directly related by R. As with transitivity and converse well-
foundedness, I am not familiar with any semantic proof (proof by reasoning on 
R) to the effect that weak connectedness should be compatible with converse 
well-foundedness. But again, we have grammatical proofs to help us out. One 
may prove that a grammatically decidable modal system exists that is obtained 
by adding the characteristic axiom of weak connectedness to the modal system 
characterised by converse well-foundedness33. And since one may further show 
that the resulting system is characterised by a relation R combing converse well-
foundedness with weak connectedness, we may be certain that also weak 
connectedness complies with converse well-foundedness. In logic, one does not 
define impossible relations. 
So, a finite strict linear ordering of worlds is a structure on W uniting the 
conditions of irreflexivity, finiteness, transitivity, converse well-foundedness and 
K. HVIDTFELT NIELSEN 
 154
weak connectedness. Let me summarise these five formal conditions in the 
following four traits: 
1. No world has access to itself. 
2. The number of worlds in W (under R) is finite. 
3. If any two worlds are successors of a third one, then one of these two 
worlds will be the successor of the other. 
4. The ordering does not allow branching. 
 
With this ordering, I take R to represent the structure of meaning as it is argued 
and explained in my book. The first trait tells us that meanings are unrepeatable; 
the second one assures us that meanings are finite in number. We may regard 
the third trait as an indication that cause and effect will prevail between any two 
instances of meaning; and by means of the last trait, the temporal structure of 
meanings should be rendered: time does not branch off in different directions, 
but remains an ordered flux. 
Having found a formal representation of the way I believe (and have argued) 
meanings to be structured, I have finally come in full view of an effective 
solution to the problem driving my enterprise. With this paper (as with my book 
Nielsen 2003), I have wanted to show that the position of epistemic language 
scepticism need entail neither textual nor performative inconsistency. There is a 
way of speaking absolutely consistently of natural language scepticism without, 
at the same time, contradicting the position argued; it takes us beyond the limits 
of natural language, but that is as should be expected. What is more surprising 
is, perhaps, the fact that formal techniques may be adapted to suit the expressive 
needs of language theory. Having identified and defined a Kripke frame 
encapsulating those features of natural language meanings that, in my opinion, 
foster scepticism, we may now direct our attention towards the modal formal 
system characterised by that frame. If we could find a formal system decidably 
connected to the Kripke frame, we could use that system to speak with ultimate 
precision about the structure representing the general structure of meaning. As it 
turns out, my Kripke frame is in fact connected by referential decidability to a 
grammatically decidable modal system, namely, the system one obtains by 
adding the axioms known as K (for Kripke), W (for well-ordering) and D10 (D for 
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Diodorus) to the non-modal propositional system (see the appendix and note 
32). 
This system, call it KWD10, has many interesting features of its own. To mention 
only one example, it contains, as a proper part, the system KW – also known as 
GL – which is known to be a modal version of the very system PA34 that Gödel 
once proved to be grammatically undecidable35. In Nielsen (2003), I thoroughly 
discuss the special technique that Gödel devised for his proof, showing that his 
crucial results for PA do not carry over to its modal counterpart KW (and thus 
not to KWD10). Had KWD10 turned out to be grammatically undecidable, the 
whole idea of my enterprise would, of course, have been ruined. Personally, I 
find it thought provoking that the formal system in which to speak decidably of 
meaning turns out to contain, as a proper part, a modal version of the very 
system that Gödel proved to be undecidable. However, had my modal version of 
Gödel’s system inherited the grammatical undecidability of the original, I would 
have met with quite a remarkable misfortune – or learned an even more 
extraordinary lesson. 
Considering my scheme of using formal language in order to avoid the 
undecidabilities of natural language, it would have been disastrous to my whole 
project had the formal system I ended up with turned out to be provably 
undecidable. On the other hand, since mathematicians look at PA as the formal 
system encapsulating the essence of number theory, this misfortune might have 
induced me to speculate on a possible similarity between the undecidabilities of 
meanings and of numbers. I might have interpreted my failure as the proof that 
the common KW part of meaning theory and number theory would, in the 
grammars of both systems, engender the same kind of undecidability. 
However, such are mere speculations. The system I identified as a possible theory 
of meaning is perfectly decidable, both grammatically and referentially. The 
system does have an interesting affinity to number theory. I do believe that the 
processing of meaning bears a structural relationship to the ordering of 
numbers. The correspondence may be banal or prove illuminating to linguists 
and language theorists. Only time can tell. But that is beyond the present point. 
My ambition has been to show that there exists a perfectly decidable way of 
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expressing language scepticism. And, with all due modesty, I think I achieved 
my goal. 
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1 The notion of performative (in)consistency was first discussed, if not actually named, in 
Apel (1973). 
2 Nielsen (2003). 
3 This assumption has been contested. In Strauss (1948), the philosopher Leo Strauss 
forcefully argues that Spinoza wrote his treatises with a view to more strategic 
intentions than those of pure cognition. A specimen of language scepticism, Strauss’s 
unorthodox reading is discussed in Nielsen (2003). 
4 See for instance Hooker (1980). 
5 In Gödel (1931). 
6 For a discussion of decidability in terms of referential concepts such as satisfiability and 
validity, see Church (1956). 
7 In future references to formal systems and structures, the qualification physical will be 
dropped, but is, unless otherwise indicated, to be tacitly assumed. 
8 By parsing the logician refers to more or less the same kind of operations as does the 
linguist by grammatical analysis. Under the condition of grammatical decidability, any 
expressions may be uniquely assigned to a grammatical category, also expressions that 
are not well-formed (grammatically impermissible combinations of words and 
operators) will be uniquely assigned to a category: the category of all malformed 
expressions. 
9 That is of course without the restrictions of finiteness and physicality. 
10 The difference between grammatical proofs and non-grammatical proofs is discussed in 
Nielsen (2003). 
11 The story of decidability started with a non-grammatical proof of grammatical proofs: 
Gödel proved, in Gödel (1931), in a non-grammatical way that formal systems of a 
certain kind will contain sentences that are undecidable in the sense that neither the 
sentences themselves, nor their negations can be grammatically proved.  
12 For a full and very readable (also for non-logicians) discussion of the notions of 
soundness and completeness, see Hughes and Cresswell (1984). In addition to the 
semantic kind of completeness, a grammatical version also exists. In this paper, only 
semantic completeness will be discussed. 
13 The modern tradition of studying truth under the aspect of reference may be said to 
have originated with Frege (see Frege 1962 and 1966, papers originally published in the 
late 19th century). In the following century, Church (1956) and Montague (1974) have 
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been among the foremost spokesmen of Frege’s view. In Nielsen (2003), I give a 
detailed discussion of how to make formal truth a matter of denotation. 
14 The word cenonomy is constructed, in analogy with synonymy, homonymy, etc., from the 
Greek kenos and onoma. 
15 Synonymy is to be understood here in a referential sense. Since reference, in a logician’s 
setting, is supposed to be a function, homonymy is excluded (remember that no 
function may take one and the same argument, now to one value, now to another, as 
homonymy would demand). A reference function without synonymy is a one-to-one 
function, with synonymy being a many-to-one function. 
16 Instead of speaking of a frame, one may also speak of a class of models. See Hughes 
and Cresswell (1984) for an almost pedagogical introduction to the subject. 
17 Reference is ultimately a question of tying formal systems and models together. So, in 
order to indicate that the link of models is missing, one often uses the locution of a 
reference on a frame. The ‘on’ is to be understood as implicating the need to establish 
reference by means of all those models that one may construct on (the ground of) 
some frame. 
18 No observer can tell which meanings are occurring without ‘having’ the observed 
entities himself. So observers change by observing meanings. Another way of putting 
this odd predicament is to say that observation of meaning equals understanding (that 
is, as long as one foregoes a strictly behaviouristic approach to meaning). For a 
discussion of this intricate (and balefully philosophical) question, see Nielsen (2003) 
and Nielsen (2005). Incidentally (or perhaps not so incidentally), the very same 
question looms large in Luhmann’s system theory (see Luhmann 1980[1993] and 
Luhmann 1998). 
19 Another course open to students of cenonymy would be to keep silent. Mystics 
confronted with the impossibility of speaking about the ineffable have sometimes 
solved the problem by developing a highly eloquent kind of sigetics. 
20 On the interdependency of grammatical and referential decidability, see note 24. 
21 In logic, one makes the distinction between a model for – and a model of something. 
The first locution is used when speaking about the relationship between a formal 
system and a formal model. A model is a model for some formal system when 
soundness between model (the frame on which the model may be constructed) and 
system prevails, i.e., when all theses of the system have valid reference in the model 
and on the frame. The second locution refers to the normal idea of a model as some 
kind of representation of a segment of reality. 
22 One of the reasons why modal quantificational systems are so hard to interpret stems 
from the need to deal with two kinds of quantification: one over worlds and another 
over items in the respective worlds. 
23 Apart from the situations where two (or more) modal axioms can be shown to be 
equivalent. See Chellas (1980) for a synoptic view of such situations. 
24 All systems to be discussed in this section are grammatically decidable. Notice that 
grammatical decidability is a necessary prerequisite for referential decidability: one 
could not identify theses with valid expressions without first identifying the theses 
uniquely.  
25 When naming formulae and systems, I usually follow Hughes and Cresswell (1984); 
only occasionally, I resort to the naming practice of Lemmon and Scott (1977). 
26 According to Hughes and Cresswell (1968: 31), the system T was so baptised in 1953 by 
the logician Sobicinski. 
27 The relation converse well-foundedness as well as the reasons for choosing this name are 
thoroughly discussed in Boolos (1993). 
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28 In spite of converse well-foundedness being opposed to seriality, we do not get seriality 
just by turning converse well-foundedness around. The converse of converse well-
foundedness, that is well-foundedness, is a condition on R that makes any subset of 
worlds from W, ordered by R, contain some first world, that is, a world from which no 
other worlds (in that subset) are accessible. So whereas converse well-foundedness 
excludes seriality, well-foundedness is compatible with seriality, yet without implying 
it. 
29 In Ethica, Spinoza distinguished between three orders of cognition: the order of affects 
(merely a pre-form of cognition), the order of rational cognition and the order of 
eternal cognition. Naturally, causal and temporal structures cease to conflate when 
cognition operates under the third kind of orders. In Nielsen (2003), I identify 
Spinoza’s second order with the kind of cognition that we expect from science today. 
So, under the order of science, causality and temporality should run parallel. 
30 Spinoza believed the whole universe, including the thoughts and behaviour of man, to 
obey strict deterministic laws. 
31 For a recent survey of temporal logic, see Hasle and Øhrstrøm (1995). 
32 Prior, the founding father of temporal logic, took as his starting point an interpretation 
of Aristotle made by the Greek philosopher Diodorus (the third century B.C.). 
Diodorus had suggested that Aristotle’s modal concepts necessity and possibility be 
translated into true now and ever after and true now or sometimes later. Through this 
mixture of epistemic (truth-related) and purely temporal conditions, Diodorus, and 
with him Prior – together with most of contemporary temporal logic, made reflexivity 
part of temporal concerns. Suppose we took the operators  and ◊ to express 
Diodorus’s idea of time. And suppose we were to evaluate an expression like α in the 
Kripke way by demanding α to be true with respect to some world w only if α were 
true with respect to all worlds w’ accessible from w. Which worlds would they be? 
Since  is to mirror the idea of a proposition being true now and evermore, then 
clearly α would also have to be true with respect to w itself (the ‘now’ world, as one 
might say), and so R would have to be reflexive. By the same reasoning one realises 
that also ◊ must be interpreted by a reflexive R. 
33 An informal sketch of this proof is found in Hughes and Cresswell (1984: 104f.). 
34 PA stands for Peano Arithmetic; actually Gödel used a modified version of Russell’s 
logical system from Principia mathematica; see Gödel (1931). 
35 Boolos (1993) gives a full (if condensed) presentation of how to transform Gödel’s 
reasoning and logic into modal terms and symbolism. 
 
APPENDIX 
The characteristic axiom of normal modal systems: 
K:  (A → B) → ( A → B) 
The characteristic rule of normal modal systems: 
N: if α is a thesis, so is α 
The characteristic axiom of seriality: 
D: A → ◊A 
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The characteristic axiom of reflexivity: 
T: A → A 
(There are no characteristic axioms of non-seriality og irreflexivity, so these 
features can only be indirectly denoted) 
The characteristic axiom of transitivity: 
4: A → A 
The characteristic axiom of converse well-foundedness: 
W:  ( A → A) → A 
The characteristic axiom of strict linearity: 
D10:  (( A ∧ A) → B) ∨  (( B ∨ B) → A) 
 
The modal system KWD10 is obtained by adding to the non-modal propositional 
system (=PS) the three axioms K, W and D10 and the rule N of all normal modal 
systems. From PS, N, K and W, axiom 4 follows. 
The grammatical proof that PS, N, K and W imply 4: 
(1) A → (( A ∧ A) → ( A ∧ A)) – a substitution instance of the PS thesis p 
→ ((r ∧ q) → (q ∧ p)); substitute A for p, A for q and A for r. 
(2) A → ( ( A ∧ A) → ( A ∧ A)) – obtained from (1) by applying the modal 
equivalence ( A ∧ A) ↔ ( A ∧ A) (the modal equivalence follows 
from PS, N and K). 
(3) (A → ( ( A ∧ A) → ( A ∧ A))) – obtained from (2) by applying N. 
(4) A → ( ( ( A ∧ A) → ( A ∧ A)) – obtained from (3) by first substituting 
in K the formula ( ( A ∧ A) → ( A ∧ A)) for B and then applying modus 
ponens (if α and α → β are theses, then β is likewise one (modus ponens: 
a rule of PS)); the substitution makes K have the form (3) → (4), and since 
K and (3) are theses, (4) is likewise one by modus ponens. 
(5) ( ( A ∧ A) → ( A ∧ A)) → ( A ∧ A) – a substitution instance of W; 
substitute ( A ∧ A) for A. 
(6) ( A → ( ( A ∧ A) → ( A ∧ A))) → ( ( ( A ∧ A) → ( A ∧ A)) →  
( A ∧ A)) → ( A → ( A ∧ A)) – a substitution instance of the PS 
thesis (p → q) → ((q → r) → (p → r)); substitute A for p, ( ( A ∧ A) → 
( A ∧ A)) for q, and ( A ∧ A) for r. 
(7) A → ( A ∧ A) – obtained from (4), (5) and (6) by first realising that (6) 
has the form (4) → ((5) → (7)) and then applying modus ponens twice, 
first detaching (4) and then detaching (5). 
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(8) A → ( A ∧ A) – obtained from (7) by applying the modal 
equivalence ( A ∧ A) ↔ ( A ∧ A) (see under (2)). 
(9) ( A ∧ A) → A – a substitution instance of the PS thesis (p ∧ q) → 
p; substitute A for p and A for q. 
(10) ( A → ( A ∧ A)) → (( A ∧ A) → A) → ( A → A)) – a 
substitution instance of the PS thesis (p → q) → ((q → r) → (p → r)); 
substitute A for p, A ∧ A for q and A for r. 
(11) A → A – obtained from (8), (9) and (10) by first realising that (10) 
has the form (8) → ((9) → (11)) and then applying modus ponens twice, 
first detaching (8) and then detaching (9). – QED. 
